

Intermediate Microeconomics  
Econ 3101, Section 003  
Midterm-Solutions

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## 1 Economic Concepts

### 1.1 Definitions (10 Points)

- Equilibrium principle: everything adds up
- Monotonic preferences: more (of each good) is preferred to less
- Normal good: good for which demand goes down (up) when income goes down (up)
- Exogenous variable: variable whose value is determined outside the model
- Inelastic demand: demand that is not very responsive to price changes ( $\|PED\| < 1$ )

### 1.2 True or False (10 Points)

*False* 1. With convex preferences, people prefer one good or the other, not a mixture of both.

*True* 2. Giffen goods do not satisfy the law of demand.

*True* 3. A positive subsidy results in the expansion of the consumer's budget set.

*False* 4. Rationing poses no limit to what can be consumed in equilibrium.

*True* 5. When assets that yield the same return have different prices, arbitrage occurs.

## 2 Economic Models

### Question 1. *Consumer Choice.*

Suppose the representative consumer, Robinson Crusoe, has the following utility function:  $u(x, y) = 7x + 12y$ , where  $x$  and  $y$  denote the only two goods in the economy. Let  $p_x$  and  $p_y$  denote prices for  $x$  for  $y$ , and  $m$  income.

(a) [4] Write down the budget constraint for this consumer.

Ans:  $p_x x + p_y y = m$ .

(b) [12] Derive Robinson's demand for both  $x$  and  $y$ .

Ans: Robinson's demand is given by:

- For  $\frac{p_y}{p_x} < \frac{12}{7}$ ,  $x^* = 0; y^* = \frac{m}{p_y}$
- For  $\frac{p_y}{p_x} > \frac{12}{7}$ ,  $x^* = \frac{m}{p_x}; y^* = 0$
- For  $\frac{p_y}{p_x} = \frac{12}{7}$ ,  $(x^*, y^*) = \{(x, y) : p_x x + p_y y = m, x \geq 0, y \geq 0\}$

(c) [4] How much of  $x$  and  $y$  will Robinson consume if  $p_x = p_y = 5$  and  $m = 50$ ?

Ans:  $\frac{p_y}{p_x} = 1$ . Since  $\frac{p_y}{p_x} < \frac{12}{7}$ , from part (b) we have  $x^* = 0; y^* = 10$

**Question 2. Game Theory.**

Consider the Colluder's Dilemma. Two firms that collude successfully to suppress output can charge a higher price and hence make a larger profit (than they would by competing against each other). There is, however, an incentive to cheat: by cheating, they make even more profit but only if the other firm doesn't retaliate. If it does, they both lose out. Suppose colluding brings both parties a profit of 1000. If only one firm cheats, it makes 1200 while its partner gets 600. If retaliation occurs (i.e. they both cheat), they each get 800.

(a) [10] Construct the payoff matrix for this game.

Ans:

	Comply	Cheat
Comply	1000, 1000	600, 1200
Cheat	1200, 600	800, 800

(b) [10] Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (equilibria).

Ans:

	Comply	Cheat
Comply	1000, 1000	600, <u>1200</u>
Cheat	<u>1200</u> , 600	<u>800</u> , <u>800</u>

The only Nash equilibrium in this case is (**Cheat, Cheat**).

(c) [10] Find all purely-mixed Nash equilibrium (equilibria).

Ans: There are **no purely-mixed Nash equilibria** in this case. This is because there is a **dominant strategy (Cheat) for both players**. Alternatively, partial credit can also be awarded if the correct maximization problems are set up but the resulting answer is incorrect.

**Question 3. Mispriced Assets.**

Consider two assets,  $x$  and  $y$ , where  $x$  yields a return  $p_x$  every period and  $y$  a return of  $p_y$  every other period starting today. The interest rate is  $r$ , where  $r > 0$ .

(a) [12] At what price should assets  $x$  and  $y$  be sold so that arbitrage is not possible? Write your answer in terms of  $p_x$  and  $p_y$ .

Ans: Market price should be equal to the sum of discounted present value of all future returns to prevent arbitrage.

The price for  $x$  should then be  $\frac{p_x(1+r)}{r}$  and for  $y$   $\frac{p_y(1+r)^2}{r^2+2r}$

(b) [6] Suppose the return structure for asset  $y$  has changed so that it now yields  $p_y$  every other period half the time, and  $p_x$  the other half. (There is still no return to holding  $y$  every even period.) What will be the new price for this asset?

Ans: It's new price will be  $\frac{p_y(1+r)^4}{(1+r)^4-1} + \frac{p_x(1+r)^4}{[(1+r)^2][(1+r)^4-1]}$ .

(c) [12] Something that has been common in the lead up to the current financial crisis has been the mispricing of assets. Suppose in our model that  $x$  was mispriced and that in reality it only yields  $p_x$  with certainty every other period. What relation between  $p_x$  and  $p_y$  must hold if  $x$  and  $y$  have the same price in equilibrium? Take the return structure for  $y$  to be that given in part (b).

Ans: Find the new price for asset  $x$ :  $\frac{p_x(1+r)^2}{r^2+2r}$

Equate this price with the price for  $y$  found in part (b):  $\frac{p_x(1+r)^2}{r^2+2r} = \frac{p_y(1+r)^4}{(1+r)^4-1} + \frac{p_x(1+r)^4}{[(1+r)^2][(1+r)^4-1]}$

Simplifying yields  $p_x = p_y$